These facts already existed — scattered across comparison tables and FAQ answers across the site. This page collects them in one place, without diluting them into generic promises like "100% secure." Where we don't have a concrete mechanism to point at, we say so.
The architecture is designed so the hardware is client-owned from day one — a Mac Studio or NVIDIA Spark cluster, physically inside your office or in a Spanish-sovereign datacentre under a Spanish entity, with documents, embeddings, index, and keys living there. That's the deployment model; no client appliance has shipped yet — GESTOR, the one real production system, currently runs on our own infrastructure while we roll out the client-owned-appliance model. See §08 for exactly what's live today versus specified.
The inference cluster itself runs without an external connection: the model reasoning over your documents never sends them anywhere. But GESTOR and DESPACHO have a separate function — regulatory monitoring — that genuinely needs internet access, because its job is reading official gazettes every day: BOE, BOIB, ATIB and INE for GESTOR; DOUE, TJUE and DOGC for DESPACHO. These are two different claims — "inference is local" and "the system never touches the internet" are not the same statement, and conflating them would be exactly the kind of overreach this site has committed to avoiding. If your deployment needs to avoid even that specific outbound connection, that's an architecture conversation, not a default.
Standard manufacturer warranty plus a continuity plan designed with you. Every tier is specified to include a NAS × 3 backup in Spain with AES-256 encryption, designed to prevent data loss with recovery in hours, not days. That backup hasn't been built yet, even for our own environment — see §08.
We do the maintenance. Remote access requires explicit authorisation per session, runs through a WireGuard tunnel, and the entire session is recorded. Just-in-time access — no standing credentials, no surprise logins. This part is already in service. Everything is visible in the audit log, which you own: hash-chained (SHA-256), append-only, on your own disk, with 400-day retention. It's tamper-evident, not tamper-proof — an actor with full administrative control of the machine could recompute the chain, and we'd rather state that limit than overstate the guarantee. The log contains no personal data: fields like NIF, DNI, IBAN, name, and email are stripped before a record is written, leaving only truncated references.
Six mechanisms, each with a real status, not a blanket claim. Appliance data volume: LUKS2 (aes-xts-plain64, 512-bit master key, i.e. AES-256, NIST SP 800-38E, Argon2id key derivation) — specified, not yet deployed to a client appliance. Mac Studio nodes: FileVault, also AES-XTS-256, bound to the Secure Enclave — scheduled. Backup: AES-256 — specified per tier, not yet built (see §03). Remote support access: WireGuard, which uses ChaCha20-Poly1305 and Curve25519 — not AES; naming it correctly matters more than reusing one number everywhere — in service. Browser-to-appliance traffic: TLS — in service. Password storage: scrypt (N=32768, r=8) — in service.
An Article 28.3 GDPR processor agreement has been drafted and is currently in Spanish legal review — not yet signed. It includes a reinforced professional-secrecy clause — equivalent to the duty your firm owes your own clients — with indefinite duration after the contract ends. A valid DPA is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one, even once signed: it's one input to the analysis, not the end of it. It's accompanied by a vendor risk assessment ready to file, a sub-processor list updated against CEPD Opinion 22/2024, and an annual review calendar.
Plain Markdown in Obsidian and QMD, on your own filesystem — no proprietary format locking you to the vendor. We ingest PDF, DOCX, XLSX, and structured exports; your firm's memory is indexed within the first weeks.
In service today: authentication, roles and rate limiting; the hash-chained audit log; the client-visible audit interface; credential storage (fail-closed by default, mode 0600); encrypted transport (WireGuard + TLS). Specified but not yet deployed: the GDPR Article 28 DPA (drafted, in legal review); LUKS2 on the appliance data volume (no client appliance in service yet); FileVault on interactive nodes (scheduled, hardware on order); NAS × 3 backup (specified per tier, not yet built); off-site backup (not implemented). We'd rather this page read conservative than optimistic.
If your own risk analysis needs more detail than what's here, that's exactly the conversation we have before any deployment.
We take a small number of new clients per quarter. If you are considering working with AI Ibiza, the conversation starts here.